Source: cases/42usc1983/f3d-813-938-henderson-v-glanz.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_813/0938_01/index.html
Thus, at summary judgment, we must grant qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can show (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.
Ms. Henderson has provided no authority clearly establishing that an officer violates the Eighth Amendment when that officer, as here with DO Thomas, has no subjective knowledge of risk of assault to an inmate, leaves to attend to a medical emergency, and does so believing the inmate is in a locked room under the guard of another officer.
Moreover, although DO Thomas may have violated Jail policy by leaving the medical unit in the care of only DO Johnson, Ms. Henderson offers no authority to show this was a clearly established constitutional violation.
We lack jurisdiction over Sheriff Glanz’s interlocutory appeal because it “would require second-guessing the district court’s determinations of evidence sufficiency.”
Because it instéad challenges the district court’s factual determinations, we lack jurisdiction over DO Johnson’s appeal.
These undisputed record facts blatantly contradict the district court’s factual determination that DO Thomas could have been subjectively aware of a substantial risk of bodily harm to Ms. Henderson.
casedsl 1 case /f3d/813/0938-01 name Henderson v. Glanz cite 813 F.3d 938 (2015) court United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit date 2015-12-28 url catalog/cases/f3d/volume_813/0938_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl sha1=5bbd43d7bda9619a4b00a5f3d37dbafc41254eee chars=40102 law 42usc1983 role applied posture civil; jail inmate raped by another inmate sues two detention officers and sheriff for Eighth Amendment failure to protect; defendants' interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity; two appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, one reversed result mixed defense qualified-immunity : satisfied [law] variant not-clearly-established/officer-left-post-without-subjective-knowledge-of-risk party Detention Officer Thomas fact @3750..3912 [cuts-against] | When a gurney was requested from the medical unit, DO Thomas left to deliver it, though having an inmate deliver it would have been permissible under Jail policy. fact @27843..28056 [supports] | The record indicates that, when DO Thomas left to deliver the gurney for the medical emergency, he knew only that Ms. Henderson was in the tub room and that DO Johnson was in the medical unit outside the tub room. fact @28057..28196 [supports] | DO Thomas testified that he believed the door to the tub room was locked when he left. Ms. Henderson presented no evidence to the contrary. rule @31902..32154 | Thus, at summary judgment, we must grant qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can show (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct. rule @34744..34847 [quoted] | the Supreme Court has admonished “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” held @35138..35478 | Ms. Henderson has provided no authority clearly establishing that an officer violates the Eighth Amendment when that officer, as here with DO Thomas, has no subjective knowledge of risk of assault to an inmate, leaves to attend to a medical emergency, and does so believing the inmate is in a locked room under the guard of another officer. held @35479..35696 | Moreover, although DO Thomas may have violated Jail policy by leaving the medical unit in the care of only DO Johnson, Ms. Henderson offers no authority to show this was a clearly established constitutional violation. gloss Decided on the clearly-established prong only, but the court first overrides the district court's fact finding (risk awareness "blatantly contradicted by the record"), which effectively negates deliberate indifference. Violation of jail double-staffing policy is not a constitutional violation. element deprivation.eighth-amendment : not-reached party Detention Officer Thomas gloss Court speaks of "any violation of the Eighth Amendment she may have suffered" and decides only the second prong; yet it finds as undisputed that Thomas lacked subjective knowledge of the risk, the core of deliberate indifference. defense qualified-immunity : not-reached scope procedural party Detention Officer Johnson gloss Appeal dismissed for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction (challenge to evidence sufficiency); district court's denial of immunity stands unreviewed. defense qualified-immunity : not-reached scope procedural party Sheriff Glanz (individual capacity) gloss Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; district court's denial of immunity stands unreviewed. element deprivation.eighth-amendment : satisfied [triable] scope lower-court variant failure-to-protect/inmate-left-unsecured-with-unrestrained-inmate-in-understaffed-unit party Detention Officer Johnson; Sheriff Glanz fact @22254..22514 [supports] | Ms. Henderson asserted in her summary judgment briefing and asserts on appeal that DO Johnson knew the door to the tub room was unlocked when she left the medical unit hallway. DO Johnson’s argument does not accept as true Ms. Henderson’s version of this fact. gloss The DISTRICT COURT's ruling, narrated but not reviewed (both appeals dismissed). As to Johnson: she unlocked the holding-cell door in view of an unrestrained male inmate, left without re-locking, securing him, or checking on the shackled plaintiff. As to Glanz: a jury could infer notice from prior staff-on-inmate sexual assaults in the understaffed, unsurveilled medical unit, and no remedial response. The one fact line is plaintiff's version as this court restates it (moved in v1 from the jurisdiction block, where it showed that Johnson's appeal disputed the facts); v0 did not quote the block-quoted district-court findings. element x-interlocutory-jurisdiction : not-satisfied [law] scope procedural variant qualified-immunity-appeal/challenge-to-evidence-sufficiency party Detention Officer Johnson; Sheriff Glanz (their appeals) fact @26149..26410 [cuts-against] | Instead of accepting these facts as true or viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Henderson, Defendants argue Sheriff Glanz had no notice of a risk of assault because there had been no documented instances of inmate-on-inmate assault in the Jail. rule @19245..19385 [quoted] | instead, we lack jurisdiction only if our review would require second-guessing the district court’s determinations of evidence sufficiency.” held @27363..27529 | We lack jurisdiction over Sheriff Glanz’s interlocutory appeal because it “would require second-guessing the district court’s determinations of evidence sufficiency.” held @22132..22253 | Because it instéad challenges the district court’s factual determinations, we lack jurisdiction over DO Johnson’s appeal. gloss Not an element of the statute: Johnson v. Jones bar on interlocutory review of fact-sufficiency rulings. "not-satisfied" here = no appellate jurisdiction. element x-interlocutory-jurisdiction : satisfied [law] scope procedural variant qualified-immunity-appeal/district-court-facts-blatantly-contradicted-by-record party Detention Officer Thomas (his appeal) rule @21067..21312 [quoted] | “Second, when the ‘version of events’ the district court holds a reasonable jury could credit ‘is blatantly contradicted by the record,’ we may assess the case based on our own de novo view of which facts a reasonable jury could accept as true.” held @28197..28395 | These undisputed record facts blatantly contradict the district court’s factual determination that DO Thomas could have been subjectively aware of a substantial risk of bodily harm to Ms. Henderson. element causation : not-reached gloss Supervisory liability of the sheriff (notice + failure to respond) was the issue he tried to raise; not reviewable. element policy : not-reached gloss Sheriff did not appeal in his official capacity. element color-of-law : not-reached element person : not-reached element damages : not-reached misfit The appellate opinion decides almost nothing on the statute's elements: 2 of 3 defendants get a jurisdictional dismissal, the third a clearly-established ruling. v1 now carries the district court's triable-deliberate-indifference ruling as a `scope lower-court` block, but that block has a single borrowed fact line and no `held` (the quote set was frozen at migration), and it lumps two defendants with different theories (direct vs. supervisory) into one block. misfit `result` is per-opinion but outcomes are per-defendant (claim survives vs. Johnson and Glanz, lost vs. Thomas); "mixed" hides that. A per-`party` result would help. misfit Threshold appellate-jurisdiction holding is now `scope procedural`, but it still has to be hung on a pseudo-element (x-interlocutory-jurisdiction) whose satisfied/not-satisfied means "jurisdiction exists / does not"; there is no procedural block kind. misfit Qualified immunity has two prongs and a burden rule (plaintiff bears the burden on both once the defense is raised; forfeiture of prong 2 by defendants excused); neither prong structure nor burden allocation is expressible. The holding "plaintiff provided no authority" is a failure-of-burden holding, tagged [law]. misfit The deprivation sub-element with real content here is the mental state (subjective awareness of substantial risk); there is no id for a state-of-mind component (deprivation.eighth-amendment.deliberate-indifference would be natural), and the court negates it factually while formally not reaching the violation. misfit Rich facts about the sheriff's notice (prior assaults, understaffing, no video) are in the opinion; they now have a home (the lower-court block) but remain unquoted because the migration froze the quote set.