Source: cases/42usc1981/f3d-935-510-boxill-v-ogrady.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_935/0510_01/index.html
The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").
That is what Boxill did here-her complaint makes a claim "pursuant [to] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate ... her correlative rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."
To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).
Boxill does allege that the "Defendants knew" the letter drafted about O'Grady's behavior was "memorializing complaints made" by her. But again, this vague, conclusory reference to "the Defendants" is not enough to make a plausible showing that O'Grady was aware of her complaints.
To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).
As explained, Boxill's complaint does not plausibly allege that any Defendant took an adverse action against her because of her protected speech.
casedsl 1
case /f3d/935/0510-01
name Boxill v. O’Grady
cite 935 F.3d 510 (2019)
court United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
date 2019-08-16
url catalog/cases/f3d/volume_935/0510_01/index.html
source ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl sha1=dfea3da6a402058d0732fea06d5a327790eca30a chars=20792
law 42usc1981
role applied
posture Appeal from Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; §1981 retaliation dismissed despite availability of §1983 vehicle; equal-protection hostile-environment claim separately revived.
result claimant-lost
element state-remedial-route : satisfied [law]
variant state-remedy/section1983-pleaded
party Individual judges and court administrator
fact @409..662 [supports] | Boxill worked at FCMC as its Specialty Dockets Coordinator. Four of the Defendants below-Michael Brandt, Carrie Glaeden, James Green, and James O'Grady-were state court judges at FCMC. The remaining Defendant, Emily Shaw, was FCMC's Court Administrator.
rule @13207..13654 | The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").
held @13655..13808 | That is what Boxill did here-her complaint makes a claim "pursuant [to] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate ... her correlative rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."
gloss Satisfied means Boxill pleaded the proper remedial vehicle, not that any official committed a §1981 violation.
element defendant-knowledge : not-satisfied [pleaded]
variant knowledge/conclusory-collective-allegation
party O’Grady
count Section 1981 retaliation
fact @2655..2777 [supports] | Boxill alleges that "the Defendants knew" this letter was meant to "memorializ[e] complaints made" by her against O'Grady.
fact @10664..10788 [cuts-against absent] | And Boxill has offered no plausible, non-conclusory facts to show that O'Grady was even aware of her complaints against him.
rule @14122..14517 | To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).
held @19558..19839 | Boxill does allege that the "Defendants knew" the letter drafted about O'Grady's behavior was "memorializing complaints made" by her. But again, this vague, conclusory reference to "the Defendants" is not enough to make a plausible showing that O'Grady was aware of her complaints.
gloss The earlier knowledge discussion concerns First Amendment retaliation, but the §1981 section expressly incorporates that factual deficiency. No First Amendment motivating-factor rule is imported into §1981.
element retaliatory-causation : not-satisfied [pleaded]
variant retaliation/undifferentiated-officials
party All individual defendants
count Section 1981 retaliation
fact @1325..1911 [supports] | According to the complaint, Boxill reported her "ongoing harassment" to administrators and judges at FCMC-including Green and Shaw-several times between 2011 and 2013. She alleges that "[n]o administrator or Judge acted on these reports, but each discouraged [her] from action." In April 2013, the "Defendants began removing [her] responsibilities and diminishing [her] abilities to function as coordinator." Sometime thereafter, she "learned that Defendants had given a male subordinate a $14,000.00 per year increase in salary with no commensurate consideration of her contributions."
fact @9032..9548 [cuts-against absent] | Boxill has nevertheless failed to state a plausible retaliation claim against Brandt, Glaeden, Green, or Shaw. These allegations suffer from the same flaw: Boxill does not state facts specific to those Defendants. Her claims rest on broad, conclusory allegations that the "Defendants" diminished her job responsibilities; but she offers no facts to support a reasonable inference that any of these Defendants individually took such an action, much less that he or she did so in response to Boxill's protected speech.
rule @14122..14517 | To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).
held @14518..14663 | As explained, Boxill's complaint does not plausibly allege that any Defendant took an adverse action against her because of her protected speech.
gloss Fails to connect any particular defendant’s materially adverse conduct to protected complaints. The result records §1981 only; the revived hostile-environment branch arises under equal protection, not the appealed §1981 claim.
misfit IR court string says Six Circuit; corrected to Sixth Circuit. Footnote at 19840 states §1981 discrimination was not pursued on appeal. This pre-Comcast pleading decision supplies no modern but-for discrimination finding.