Source: cases/21usc841/us-569-184-moncrieffe-v-holder.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/us/volume_569/0184_01/index.html
In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.
There is no question that it is a federal crime to "possess with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled substance," 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one of which is marijuana, § 812(c). So far, the state and federal provisions correspond.
These dovetailing provisions create two mutually exclusive categories of punishment for CSA marijuana distribution offenses: one a felony, and one not.
The only way to know whether a marijuana distribution offense is "punishable as a felony" under the CSA, Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, is to know whether the conditions described in paragraph (4) are present or absent.
The CSA's text makes neither provision the default. Rather, each is drafted to be exclusive of the other.
In contrast, the fact of a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, standing alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana was involved.
Ambiguity on this point means that the conviction did not "necessarily" involve facts that correspond to an offense punishable as a felony under the CSA.
(1) possession (2) of marijuana (a controlled substance), (3) with intent to distribute it.
casedsl 1 case /us/569/0184-01 name Moncrieffe v. Holder cite 569 U.S. 184 (2013) court Supreme Court of the United States date 2013-04-23 url catalog/cases/us/volume_569/0184_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl sha1=7a5e5b3c126af624d9f3b949bbeafd762eed57ea chars=60000 law 21usc841 (a)(1),(b)(1)(D),(b)(4) role comparator posture immigration removal (civil); BIA held a Georgia marijuana possession-with-intent conviction an INA "aggravated felony" because punishable as a felony under 841, CA5 denied review; certiorari by the noncitizen; 841 is the federal comparator under the categorical approach, not the statute of conviction result claimant-lost element intent-to-distribute : satisfied [law] variant categorical-match/state-possession-with-intent-offense count Georgia offense of conviction, Ga. Code 16-13-30(j)(1) theory categorical comparison in the abstract to 841(a)(1): first condition, the state offense necessarily proscribes CSA conduct fact @2909..2984 [cuts-against] | During a 2007 traffic stop, police found 1.3 grams of marijuana in his car. fact @3052..3184 [supports] | Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of Ga.Code Ann. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2007). rule @9133..9383 | In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct. held @10025..10256 | There is no question that it is a federal crime to "possess with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled substance," 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one of which is marijuana, § 812(c). So far, the state and federal provisions correspond. gloss Not a finding about what Moncrieffe did: the state offense's elements (possession, marijuana, intent to distribute) correspond to the 841(a)(1) offense. The actual facts are legally irrelevant under the categorical approach. element quantity.marijuana-small-amount-no-remuneration : satisfied [law] variant felony-vs-misdemeanor-tier/state-conviction-does-not-negate-b4-social-sharing count Georgia offense of conviction, Ga. Code 16-13-30(j)(1) theory categorical comparison: second condition, whether the conviction necessarily establishes the (b)(1)(D) felony tier rather than the (b)(4) misdemeanor tier fact @12485..12844 [supports] | It is possible neither was; we know that Georgia prosecutes this offense when a defendant possesses only a small amount of marijuana, see, e.g., Taylor v. State, 260 Ga.App. 890, 581 S.E.2d 386, 388 (2003) (6.6 grams), and that "distribution" does not require remuneration, see, e.g., Hadden v. State, 181 Ga.App. 628, 628-629, 353 S.E.2d 532, 533-534 (1987). rule @11581..11732 | These dovetailing provisions create two mutually exclusive categories of punishment for CSA marijuana distribution offenses: one a felony, and one not. rule @11733..11960 | The only way to know whether a marijuana distribution offense is "punishable as a felony" under the CSA, Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, is to know whether the conditions described in paragraph (4) are present or absent. rule @16730..16835 | The CSA's text makes neither provision the default. Rather, each is drafted to be exclusive of the other. held @12280..12484 | In contrast, the fact of a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, standing alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana was involved. held @12938..13091 | Ambiguity on this point means that the conviction did not "necessarily" involve facts that correspond to an offense punishable as a felony under the CSA. gloss Holding direction: the id is the (b)(4) exception, and `satisfied` means the conviction is treated as resting on (b)(4) conduct because it does not rule that conduct out; the felony tier is therefore NOT necessarily established (v0 recorded the same ruling as not-satisfied of the felony tier). Nothing is found about Moncrieffe's own conduct. gloss 841(b)(4) (small amount of marijuana, no remuneration -> treated as simple possession) is read as one of two mutually exclusive punishment tiers, not a mitigating exception to a felony default. A state statute covering social sharing therefore is not categorically an 841 felony. "Small amount" itself is left undefined. In an actual federal prosecution the lower courts put the (b)(4) burden on the defendant; the Court holds that procedural overlay irrelevant here. element substance : satisfied [conceded] variant schedule-i/marijuana rule @14158..14249 | (1) possession (2) of marijuana (a controlled substance), (3) with intent to distribute it. element possession : not-reached gloss Subsumed in the categorical match above; not separately analysed. element knowledge : not-reached misfit `role comparator` now marks that this is an INA aggravated-felony case (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) -> 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2) -> CSA felony) in which 841 is only the generic federal yardstick, but the role cannot name the compared law, and "claimant", "result" and satisfied/not-satisfied remain forced: result claimant-lost here means the Government failed to show the state conviction was categorically an 841 felony. misfit The categorical approach compares STATUTE to STATUTE (least conduct criminalized by the state law vs. the federal offense); the case's own facts (1.3 g in a car) are expressly irrelevant. The notation's fact->element model has no slot for a law-to-law subsumption test or for "the minimum conduct the state prosecutes" (the fact line under quantity is about Georgia practice, not about this defendant; its polarity is relative to the (b)(4) conditions being present in the minimum conduct, and the 1.3 g fact is tagged cuts-against intent although it is legally irrelevant). misfit The holding is about the status of a penalty provision: (b)(4) is neither an offense element nor a mere mitigating sentencing factor for this purpose, and neither (b)(1)(D) nor (b)(4) is the default. ELEMENTS has no id for (b)(4); recorded as a dotted sub-id of quantity, though (b)(4) also turns on remuneration, which is not a quantity. misfit Burden allocation differs by context (defendant bears the (b)(4) burden in a federal prosecution; irrelevant in the categorical inquiry) and cannot be expressed. misfit Two dissents (Thomas; Alito) are not recorded; v1 could hold them in `scope dissent` blocks, but the v0->v1 migration adds no quotes. Text truncated at 60000 chars inside Alito's dissent; the majority opinion and its footnotes are complete.