Source: cases/21usc841/f4th-142-259-us-v-suncar.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f4th/volume_142/259/index.html
because under federal law the term “distribute” means “to deliver,” and the term “to deliver” includes “actual, constructive, or attempted transfer[s],” an “attempted transfer” is an actual delivery, not an attempted one.
we agree with Glass that the Pennsylvania legislature’s choice to include offers to sell in one provision of section 780-113 and to exclude them in another must mean something.
All said, we reject Suncar’s argument that section 780- 113(a)(30) includes offers to sell.
If a court read the drug distribution provision as criminalizing attempt offenses when a separate provision already did so, it would render that separate provision superfluous.
and criminalizes only the completed offense of “attempted transfer,” section 780–113(a)(30) isn’t categorically overbroad as compared to the guidelines.
casedsl 1
case /f4th/142/259
name United States v. Rashun Suncar
cite 142 F.4th 259 (2025)
court Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
date 2025-07-02
url catalog/cases/f4th/volume_142/259/index.html
source ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl sha1=c502a08fb96a2c254315bd6caf97cc6306dbf3e8 chars=24332
law 21usc841 (a)(1),(b)(1)(C)
role comparator
posture criminal; guilty plea to one count of fentanyl distribution; defendant appeals only the Guidelines career-offender enhancement (whether prior Pennsylvania drug-delivery convictions are "controlled substance offenses")
result claimant-won
element act.distribute : satisfied [conceded]
role background
variant sale/controlled-buy-by-informant
fact @2811..2928 [supports] | Twice, Suncar sold a confidential informant oxycodone pills, some of which contained a detectable amount of fentanyl.
fact @3051..3178 [supports] | Suncar ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).
gloss The 841 conviction rests on the guilty plea and is not challenged; it is the backdrop of the sentencing appeal.
element act.distribute : not-reached
theory federal "distribute" restated as the analogy for reading Pennsylvania "delivery"
rule @21003..21224 | because under federal law the term “distribute” means “to deliver,” and the term “to deliver” includes “actual, constructive, or attempted transfer[s],” an “attempted transfer” is an actual delivery, not an attempted one.
gloss Applied to no conduct in this case. The rule line (restating Groves, 4th Cir. 2023) is the opinion's only construction of federal "distribute": an attempted transfer is a completed distribution, not an inchoate attempt.
element substance : satisfied [conceded]
role background
variant identity/counterfeit-pills-containing-fentanyl
fact @2811..2928 [supports] | Twice, Suncar sold a confidential informant oxycodone pills, some of which contained a detectable amount of fentanyl.
gloss Pills sold as oxycodone, charged as fentanyl under (b)(1)(C) (no quantity threshold); knowledge of the fentanyl content is not discussed.
element x-categorical-match : satisfied [law]
variant state-predicate-matches-federal-offence/no-implied-offer-to-sell
count prior Pennsylvania convictions, 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) delivery, vs Guidelines "distribution"
theory offer-to-sell overbreadth argument
fact @3428..3551 [supports] | Suncar’s two prior state drug convictions were for delivery of cocaine under 35 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30).
fact @9844..10030 [supports] | The Pennsylvania statute, of course, says nothing about offers to sell, but Suncar asks us to read in that language based on a single non-precedential decision from a Pennsylvania court.
rule @16947..17123 | we agree with Glass that the Pennsylvania legislature’s choice to include offers to sell in one provision of section 780-113 and to exclude them in another must mean something.
held @18844..18935 | All said, we reject Suncar’s argument that section 780- 113(a)(30) includes offers to sell.
gloss A non-precedential intermediate state decision (Walker) reading offers into the statute is treated as dicta; the court predicts the state supreme court would follow the text. Statutes that expressly reach offers (e.g. Texas "deliver") are overbroad; this one is not.
element x-categorical-match : satisfied [law]
variant state-predicate-matches-federal-offence/attempted-transfer-is-completed-delivery
count prior Pennsylvania convictions, 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) delivery, vs Guidelines "distribution"
theory attempted-transfer overbreadth argument
fact @8800..9020 [cuts-against] | And the statute defines “delivery” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, other drug, device or cosmetic whether or not there is an agency relationship.”
fact @23155..23250 [supports] | But Pennsylvania does criminalize attempts separately, as do North Carolina and South Carolina.
rule @21410..21586 | If a court read the drug distribution provision as criminalizing attempt offenses when a separate provision already did so, it would render that separate provision superfluous.
held @23976..24128 | and criminalizes only the completed offense of “attempted transfer,” section 780–113(a)(30) isn’t categorically overbroad as compared to the guidelines.
gloss Turns on whether the jurisdiction criminalises attempt separately (then "attempted transfer" inside "delivery" is a completed offence); contrast Campbell (W. Va. statute treated as embedding an inchoate attempt, not a predicate).
element prior-conviction : not-reached
gloss The recidivism issue is the Guidelines career-offender enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1/4B1.2(b)), not a § 841(b) statutory enhancement.
element knowledge : not-reached
element quantity : not-reached
misfit The § 841 conviction is only the backdrop (guilty plea, unchallenged: the `role background` blocks); the entire analysis is a categorical comparison of a STATE statute against the Guidelines term "distribution" (`role comparator`). The role cannot name the compared law, the comparison is still an ad-hoc x-categorical-match element, and the conduct-level `fact` slot is filled with statements about statutory text and the record of conviction, so polarity there means "towards / away from a match".
misfit The yardstick is U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), not § 841; the opinion touches the federal statute only by restating Groves (federal "distribute" = "deliver" incl. attempted transfer, 21 U.S.C. § 802(8),(11)). That is a genuine interpretive rule for act.distribute but it is precedent restated, not a holding of this case; `rule` cannot mark that difference ([quoted] does not fit: the sentence is this court's paraphrase of its own precedent around quoted fragments).
misfit `result` claimant-won describes the sentencing appeal outcome (affirmed); the § 841 liability itself was never contested, so "result of the claim under this statute in this opinion" is ill-defined.
misfit Source text is a slip opinion flattened into a single paragraph with page headers ("USCA4 Appeal: ... Pg: n of 15") and footnotes interleaved mid-sentence; several of the best sentences (e.g. the full sentence concluding the attempted-transfer holding, and the statement of the least-culpable-conduct test) are split by header debris and can only be quoted as fragments.
misfit An Erie-style question (how a federal court treats a non-precedential intermediate state-court reading of the state statute) drives half the opinion; it is a rule about sources of law, not about any element.