Source: cases/21usc841/f3d-910-1174-guillen-v-us-atty-gen.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_910/1174_01/index.html
We hold that the Board was correct in concluding that the statute is divisible and in finding that Guillen's convictions for possession of cocaine relate to a controlled substance as defined by federal law.
casedsl 1.2 # author: Flash2 (gemini-3.8-flash-high) # triaged-by: Fable (2026-11-10) case /f3d/910/1174-01 name Guillen v. U.S. Attorney Gen. cite 910 F.3d 1174 (2018) court United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit date 2018-12-13 url catalog/cases/f3d/volume_910/1174_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/f3d_910.jsonl sha1=4ffa90acd1d3d9b215926662ca2300ac678636b1 chars=34273 opinion maj : majority by Marcus @0..34273 controlling ? opinion: body ends at "PETITION DENIED." (@33411); the three paragraphs @33411..34273 are the opinion's own footnotes appended by the IR, contiguous, so one span. ? role: § 841(a)(1) is cited once, as a drafting analogy (both statutes use the general term "controlled substance"); the generic federal yardstick actually compared is the § 802(6) definition via 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Kept as comparator rather than background because the court does decide a modified-categorical comparison of a state drug offense to the federal CSA definition. ? other: result — "claimant" follows the Moncrieffe file's convention: the Government is the side asserting the match to the federal definition, and it prevailed (petition denied). law 21usc841 (a)(1) role comparator posture immigration removal (civil); petition for review of a BIA order finding a lawful permanent resident removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) on Florida cocaine-possession convictions (Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a)); the federal CSA is the generic comparator under the (modified) categorical approach, § 841(a)(1) itself only a drafting analogy result claimant-won element x-categorical-match : satisfied [law] route _whole pattern divisible-state-drug-schedule-matches-federal fact @10858..10988 [cuts-against] | The Florida controlled substance schedules undeniably are broader than the definition of "controlled substance" under federal law. fact @32735..32968 [supports] | Each relevant criminal information specifically identified the substance involved in Guillen's offenses, and they report that Guillen was charged with "unlawfully and feloniously possess[ing] a controlled substance, to-wit: Cocaine." rule @13941..14121 [quoted] | The modified categorical approach applies when a statute is "divisible," that is, "when it lists a number of alternative elements that effectively create several different crimes." held @11216..11422 | We hold that the Board was correct in concluding that the statute is divisible and in finding that Guillen's convictions for possession of cocaine relate to a controlled substance as defined by federal law. gloss Not a categorical match (Florida's schedules are broader, undisputed), but Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a) is divisible by the identity of the substance; under the modified categorical approach the conviction records show cocaine, a federally scheduled substance, so the convictions "relat[e] to a controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802. The comparison is to the § 802(6) definition, not to the elements of § 841(a)(1). ? polarity: the facts are the state statute's breadth and the Shepard record identifying the offense of conviction, not conduct proving a § 841 element.