Source: cases/21usc841/f2d-779-1098-united-states-v-prieto-tejas.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f2d/volume_779/1098_01/index.html
Intent to distribute a controlled substance may generally be inferred solely from possession of a large amount of the substance.
The purity and value of the substance also are relevant to the possessor’s intent to distribute.
Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could infer either that he did not use a large amount and intended to sell a portion of the cocaine, or that he did consume large amounts and also sold cocaine to supplement his income in support of his expensive habit.
The presence of the scale in addition to the quality and quantity of the cocaine and Prieto-Tejas’s testimony concerning his cocaine use support a finding of his intent to distribute.
Prieto-Tejas admitted knowing possession of all the cocaine found in his car, but claimed that it was for his personal consumption and that the evidence failed to establish his intent to distribute.
A conviction for possession of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires proof of knowing possession with intent to distribute (or manufacture or dispense) the substance.
Prieto-Tejas admitted knowing possession of all the cocaine found in his car, but claimed that it was for his personal consumption and that the evidence failed to establish his intent to distribute.
Possession of a narcotic may be actual or constructive, may be joint with others, and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Dusal may be deemed to have been in constructive possession of the cocaine, which he knew of, because such possession may be proved when one “has dominion over or controls the premises or vehicle where contraband is seized.”
To obtain a conviction under section 846, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of an agreement to violate the drug laws and each coconspirator’s (2) knowledge of the agreement, (3) intent to join it, and (4) participation in the conspiracy.
But an express, explicit agreement is normally not required, and a tacit, mutual agreement with common design, purpose, and understanding will usually suffice.
The two men clearly acted in concert in transporting a significant amount of cocaine.
The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer a tacit agreement between Dusal and Prieto-Tejas and their knowledge, intent to join, and participation in the agreement.
casedsl 1 case /f2d/779/1098-01 name United States v. Prieto-Tejas cite 779 F.2d 1098 (1986) court United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit date 1986-01-06 url catalog/cases/f2d/volume_779/1098_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/f2d_779.jsonl sha1=4bd40b4e046929b87d89b79424602a951284bfac chars=25016 law 21usc841 (a)(1) role applied posture criminal; jury convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 846 conspiracy, and 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2) firearm; defendant appeals sufficiency of the evidence on each count result claimant-won element intent-to-distribute : satisfied [proved] variant inferred/quantity-purity-scale-and-unaffordable-claimed-habit party Prieto-Tejas count substantive 841(a)(1) possession-with-intent count fact @6630..6730 [supports] | The bags contained 27.79 grams of 82 percent pure cocaine and 2.89 grams of 73 percent pure cocaine. fact @6839..6929 [supports] | The evidence suggested that this cocaine was of a purity usually diluted for distribution. fact @9212..9391 [supports] | The scale had traces of cocaine in the weighing pans and the DEA agent testified that scales of this type are commonly used by those who sell cocaine, but not often by purchasers. fact @7439..7598 [cuts-against] | Prieto-Tejas testified that he was addicted to cocaine and that at the time of his arrest he had been using up to three or four grams a day for several months. fact @8243..8360 [supports] | Construed most favorably to him, his testimony would indicate that his total income was at the most $2,000 per month. rule @5865..5993 | Intent to distribute a controlled substance may generally be inferred solely from possession of a large amount of the substance. rule @6177..6273 | The purity and value of the substance also are relevant to the possessor’s intent to distribute. held @8838..9092 | Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could infer either that he did not use a large amount and intended to sell a portion of the cocaine, or that he did consume large amounts and also sold cocaine to supplement his income in support of his expensive habit. held @9392..9575 | The presence of the scale in addition to the quality and quantity of the cocaine and Prieto-Tejas’s testimony concerning his cocaine use support a finding of his intent to distribute. gloss About 30 g (roughly one ounce) of high-purity cocaine: not a quantity that alone compels the inference. Personal-use defense defeated by the defendant's own numbers (claimed habit cost more than his income), plus a cocaine-dusted scale and purity suited to cutting. element possession : satisfied [conceded] variant actual/admitted-ownership-of-drugs-hidden-in-own-car party Prieto-Tejas fact @802..921 [supports] | Dusal was driving a 1978 Oldsmobile and Prieto-Tejas, who owned the automobile, was riding in the front passenger seat. fact @2869..2996 [supports] | When questioned at the checkpoint, Prieto-Tejas told Nichols that the cocaine belonged to him, but denied knowledge of the gun. held @5653..5851 | Prieto-Tejas admitted knowing possession of all the cocaine found in his car, but claimed that it was for his personal consumption and that the evidence failed to establish his intent to distribute. element knowledge : satisfied [conceded] variant admitted/defendant-admits-knowing-possession party Prieto-Tejas rule @5220..5418 | A conviction for possession of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires proof of knowing possession with intent to distribute (or manufacture or dispense) the substance. held @5653..5851 | Prieto-Tejas admitted knowing possession of all the cocaine found in his car, but claimed that it was for his personal consumption and that the evidence failed to establish his intent to distribute. element possession : satisfied [proved] variant constructive/driver-with-dominion-over-vehicle-holding-drugs party Dusal (co-defendant, not an appellant) count 846 conspiracy count (his possession is found as a step in the conspiracy analysis; no 841 conviction of his is under review) fact @12216..12297 [supports] | Both men were aware of the large amount of cocaine that they carried on the trip. rule @12298..12425 | Possession of a narcotic may be actual or constructive, may be joint with others, and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. held @12489..12713 | Dusal may be deemed to have been in constructive possession of the cocaine, which he knew of, because such possession may be proved when one “has dominion over or controls the premises or vehicle where contraband is seized.” gloss Driver of another man's car, who knew of the cocaine hidden in it, constructively and jointly possesses it. element aiding : satisfied [proved] role background gloss NOT aiding liability under § 841: this is the separate 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy count, parked under `aiding` only because neov2/law/21usc841.law declares no § 846 id; `role background` keeps it out of the § 841 instances. variant conspiracy-846/tacit-agreement-inferred-from-joint-transport party Prieto-Tejas (with Dusal) count 21 U.S.C. 846 conspiracy count fact @12094..12215 [supports] | They entered into an agreement to travel together to San Antonio. Prieto-Tejas purchased a car and Dusal agreed to drive. fact @13012..13131 [supports] | Furthermore, both men were wearing a large amount of gold jewelry, although neither had a significant source of income. rule @10035..10309 | To obtain a conviction under section 846, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of an agreement to violate the drug laws and each coconspirator’s (2) knowledge of the agreement, (3) intent to join it, and (4) participation in the conspiracy. rule @10592..10751 | But an express, explicit agreement is normally not required, and a tacit, mutual agreement with common design, purpose, and understanding will usually suffice. held @13417..13502 | The two men clearly acted in concert in transporting a significant amount of cocaine. held @13132..13318 | The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to infer a tacit agreement between Dusal and Prieto-Tejas and their knowledge, intent to join, and participation in the agreement. gloss Separate offence under 21 U.S.C. 846 (v0 parked it under `aiding`); kept as a background block, not as aiding liability under 841. element substance : not-reached gloss Cocaine, Schedule II; noted in a footnote, undisputed. element quantity : not-reached gloss Pre-1986-amendment sentencing; quantity matters only as evidence of intent. misfit The same fact (quantity/purity of the drug) is not an element here but EVIDENCE of another element (intent); the notation cannot mark an evidentiary inference (possession of amount X -> intent) as distinct from a fact directly satisfying an element. Polarity now tags the addiction testimony cuts-against and the income figure supports, but not that the second rebuts the first (personal-use explanation undermined by income). misfit The held line is an either/or inference (he lied about his habit, or he sells to fund it): the court upholds the element on alternative factual theories without choosing; one variant label cannot carry a disjunction. misfit Conspiracy under 846 is a distinct offence with its own four elements (agreement, knowledge, intent to join, participation); it is now one background block (under `aiding`, see its gloss) instead of sitting under `aiding`, which is honest about the statute but still flattens the four elements. An 846 law file with its own elements would be cleaner. misfit The reversed 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2) firearm count (Texas traveler's exemption; plain-error instruction) is a different statute and is omitted; "result claimant-won" is therefore true only for the 841/846 counts while the opinion's overall disposition is affirmed in part, reversed in part. misfit The Dusal possession block concerns a non-party to the appeal and is decided inside the 846 sufficiency analysis, not on any 841 count under review. `party` and `count` say so, but the block still parses as an applied merits instance of `possession`: no role/scope value means "element of this statute decided as a step toward a sibling offence".