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cases/18usc924/us-604-423-delligatti-v-us.case

Source: cases/18usc924/us-604-423-delligatti-v-us.case

Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/clus/volume_604/423/index.html

Verbatim annotated passages

If the offense can be committed without the use, at- tempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime of violence under the elements clause.
There is no excep- tion to this principle when an offender causes bodily injury by omission rather than affrmative act.
Thus, second-degree murder in New York—and, by extension, Delligatti's VICAR offense premised on it—is a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s elements clause.
The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force against another person.

Exact source text

casedsl 1.2

# author: Flash3 (gemini-3.8-flash-high)
# triaged-by: Fable (2026-11-10)
case /us/604/423
  name    Delligatti v. United States
  cite    604 U.S. 423 (2025)
  court   Supreme Court of the United States
  date    2025-03-21
  url     catalog/cases/clus/volume_604/423/index.html
  source  ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl sha1=696ffb7b063e64d5a728c6b275e16860644d4262 chars=59999

# IR text is a preliminary print in one unbroken paragraph, capped at 59999 chars: syllabus and counsel before @7216; the dissent is cut off.
opinion op : majority by Thomas @7216..36389 controlling
opinion dis : dissent by Gorsuch @36389..59999
party p1 : Salvatore Delligatti
count c1 : 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (predicate: VICAR attempted murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), resting on New York second-degree murder)

law 18usc924 (c)(3)(A)
  role    applied
  posture certiorari to the Second Circuit after jury conviction; pretrial motion to dismiss the § 924(c) count for want of a valid predicate denied; Second Circuit affirmed; affirmed (7-2)
  result  claimant-won

element predicate.violence : satisfied [law]
  party   p1
  count   c1
  route   elements-clause
  pattern intentional murder that state law allows to be committed by omission of a legal duty
  rule @9683..9833 | If the offense can be committed without the use, at- tempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime of violence under the elements clause.
  rule @14738..14857 | There is no excep- tion to this principle when an offender causes bodily injury by omission rather than affrmative act.
  fact @10200..10326 [neutral] | Delligatti recruited several members of a street gang to carry out the job and provided them with a car and a loaded revolver.
  held @23758..23914 | Thus, second-degree murder in New York—and, by extension, Delligatti's VICAR offense premised on it—is a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s elements clause.
  held @36143..36298 | The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force against another person.
  gloss   Castleman's principle (knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force) extends to § 924(c)(3)(A) and has no exception for harm caused by omission; New York second-degree murder, and the VICAR offense premised on it, therefore qualifies. The murder-for-hire plot is [neutral]: under the categorical approach the court does not examine actual conduct.
  gloss   Two points are assumed, not decided: that the attempt qualifies if the completed offense does (undisputed before the Court, fn. 2), and that "physical force" in § 924(c) means Johnson violent force (fn. 3). The Court also expresses no view on whether a VICAR offense can qualify independently of its state predicate (fn. 1).