Source: cases/18usc924/us-572-65-rosemond-v-us.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/us/volume_572/0065_01/index.html
Rosemond therefore could assist in § 924(c)'s violation by facilitating either the drug transaction or the firearm use (or of course both).
It is inconsequential, as courts applying both the common law and § 2 have held, that his acts did not advance each element of the offense; all that matters is that they facilitated one component.
Under that established approach, Rosemond's participation in the drug deal here satisfies the affirmative-act requirement for aiding and abetting a § 924(c) violation.
An active participant in a drug transaction has the intent needed to aid and abet a § 924(c) violation when he knows that one of his confederates will carry a gun.
For all that to be true, though, the § 924(c) defendant's knowledge of a firearm must be advance knowledge-or otherwise said, knowledge that enables him to make the relevant legal (and indeed, moral) choice.
Of course, if a defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun was displayed or used by a confederate, the jury can permissibly infer from his failure to object or withdraw that he had such knowledge.
Under these principles, the District Court erred in instructing the jury, because it did not explain that Rosemond needed advance knowledge of a firearm's presence.
I reject the Court's conclusion that a conviction for aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) demands proof that the alleged aider and abettor had what the Court terms "a realistic opportunity" to refrain from engaging in the conduct at issue.
casedsl 1
case /us/572/0065-01
name Rosemond v. United States
cite 572 U.S. 65 (2014)
court Supreme Court of the United States
date 2014-03-05
url catalog/cases/us/volume_572/0065_01/index.html
source ir/caselaw/us_572.jsonl sha1=bb64fc98609bea251b12d15bdea0f282c41883b4 chars=53852
law 18usc924 (c)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. 2
role rule-announced
posture criminal; jury conviction on a general verdict (principal or aider-and-abettor) for a gun fired at a botched marijuana sale, affirmed by CA10; certiorari on what aiding and abetting a 924(c) offense requires; instruction held erroneous, judgment vacated and remanded for plain-error / harmlessness questions
result remanded
element accomplice : not-reached
theory affirmative-act requirement: facilitating the predicate drug crime alone
variant affirmative-act/participation-in-predicate-only
fact @9324..9469 [supports] | Rosemond actively participated in a drug transaction, accompanying two others to a site where money was to be exchanged for a pound of marijuana.
fact @9537..9729 [cuts-against] | He did not buy or borrow a gun to facilitate the narcotics deal; he did not carry a gun to the scene; he did not use a gun during the subsequent events constituting this criminal misadventure.
rule @13925..14064 | Rosemond therefore could assist in § 924(c)'s violation by facilitating either the drug transaction or the firearm use (or of course both).
rule @14250..14446 | It is inconsequential, as courts applying both the common law and § 2 have held, that his acts did not advance each element of the offense; all that matters is that they facilitated one component.
held @13257..13424 | Under that established approach, Rosemond's participation in the drug deal here satisfies the affirmative-act requirement for aiding and abetting a § 924(c) violation.
gloss The Court does decide this sub-prong on Rosemond's own account of his conduct (he took part in the drug deal but did nothing with a gun): the act requirement is met. It is recorded as not-reached / rule-announced because the declared element is accomplice liability as a whole (act AND intent), which is not decided; see misfit. Both fact lines are Rosemond's version, assumed for the argument.
element accomplice : not-reached
theory intent requirement: advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun
variant intent/advance-knowledge-of-confederate-gun
fact @1420..1583 [supports] | As Gonzales and Painter ran away, one of the male passengers-but again, which one is contested-exited the car and fired several shots from a semiautomatic handgun.
fact @1584..1704 [supports] | The shooter then re-entered the vehicle, and all three would-be drug dealers gave chase after the buyers-turned-robbers.
rule @19593..19756 | An active participant in a drug transaction has the intent needed to aid and abet a § 924(c) violation when he knows that one of his confederates will carry a gun.
rule @20610..20817 | For all that to be true, though, the § 924(c) defendant's knowledge of a firearm must be advance knowledge-or otherwise said, knowledge that enables him to make the relevant legal (and indeed, moral) choice.
rule @50886..51097 | Of course, if a defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun was displayed or used by a confederate, the jury can permissibly infer from his failure to object or withdraw that he had such knowledge.
held @26614..26778 | Under these principles, the District Court erred in instructing the jury, because it did not explain that Rosemond needed advance knowledge of a firearm's presence.
gloss Test announced, not applied: the instruction ("knew his cohort used a firearm") let the jury convict even if Rosemond first learned of the gun when it was fired. "Advance" means early enough to have a realistic opportunity to withdraw, not necessarily before the drug crime begins. Desire that the gun be used is not required. Whether the evidence met the test (e.g. the chase after the shots, which the third rule line says can support the inference) is left open; the facts are context, not findings.
element accomplice : not-reached
scope dissent
opinion Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part (joined by Thomas, J.)
rule @31268..31525 | I reject the Court's conclusion that a conviction for aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) demands proof that the alleged aider and abettor had what the Court terms "a realistic opportunity" to refrain from engaging in the conduct at issue.
gloss Agrees with the act analysis and that knowledge of the gun is required; rejects the realistic-opportunity-to-withdraw component as converting necessity/duress (an affirmative defense) into part of the prosecution's mens rea burden.
element use : not-reached
theory principal liability: Rosemond himself fired the gun
gloss The Government's primary theory. The verdict was general, the shooter's identity was disputed, and the Court declines to decide the Government's harmlessness argument that the jury must have found Rosemond fired the gun.
element predicate.drug : not-reached
gloss The marijuana sale as predicate was not in issue.
misfit The declared `accomplice` element has no sub-ids for its two prongs (affirmative act; intent/advance knowledge). The Court DECIDES the act prong on the defendant's own account (met) and only ANNOUNCES the intent prong (instruction error, remand). A `satisfied` block under `accomplice` would wrongly count the whole element as an instance, so the decided act prong is under-recorded as not-reached with its deciding sentence in a `held` line. Sub-ids such as accomplice.act / accomplice.intent would fix this (known misfit 3, new for this law).
misfit The ruling is on a jury instruction, with consequence (plain error, harmless error) remanded; there is no scope or holding value for "instruction erroneous, conviction vacated, sufficiency not addressed" (known misfit 2).
misfit Alternative theories under one general verdict (principal use vs aiding and abetting) cannot be tied together: the notation has no way to say the conviction stands if either block is met and that the verdict does not reveal which the jury found.
misfit The intent rule is defined by what the accomplice knew about ANOTHER person's conduct element (the confederate's use/carry) and by timing relative to the predicate crime; these cross-element and temporal relations are prose only. Reserved questions (natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine; incidental facilitators such as a gun seller) are not recordable.
misfit The 120-month consecutive sentence implies the discharge tier (`penalty.discharge`), which the opinion mentions but does not discuss; no block.