Source: cases/18usc924/f4th-142-606-us-v-myore.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f4th/volume_142/606/index.html
Section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) provides that, unless a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided, “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who . . . possesses a firearm,” shall be subject to an additional sentence of not less than seven years if the firearm is brandished.
In this case, a reasonable jury could find, based on Swallow’s testimony, that Myore and Running Shield brandished guns to force Swallow to surrender the vehicle and then fired shots before driving off in the stolen vehicle.
In Long Pumpkin we concluded that discharge of a firearm after the carjackers drove away in the stolen vehicle was not “during” the initial carjacking.
This was sufficient evidence to convict Myore under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) of knowingly brandishing a firearm “during and in relation to” a crime of violence.
casedsl 1.2 # author: Flash3 (gemini-3.8-flash-high) # triaged-by: Fable (2026-11-10) case /f4th/142/606 name United States v. JT Myore cite 142 F.4th 606 (2025) court Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit date 2025-06-27 url catalog/cases/f4th/volume_142/606/index.html source ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl sha1=0dace63fbfe43a76a8952fbb1ef7591025e670f9 chars=34483 # The IR text is one unbroken paragraph (slip opinion with page numbers and inline footnotes); the span starts at the author line, after the caption. opinion op : panel by Loken @672..34483 controlling party p1 : JT Myore count c1 : 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), using and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to the August 25, 2019 carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119; charged with § 2 aiding and abetting) law 18usc924 (c)(1)(A)(ii) role applied posture consolidated criminal appeals after two jury trials; sufficiency of the evidence for the carjacking and brandishing verdicts reviewed de novo (motion for judgment of acquittal denied below); convictions and sentence affirmed result claimant-won element penalty.brandish : satisfied [proved] decider jury review affirmed party p1 count c1 route _whole pattern two men approach a blocked-in car with guns out demanding it; victim's account inconsistent until refreshed with his police statement rule @10965..11322 | Section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) provides that, unless a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided, “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who . . . possesses a firearm,” shall be subject to an additional sentence of not less than seven years if the firearm is brandished. fact @4836..5063 [supports] | However, after having his recollection refreshed with his signed written statement to police that day, Swallow testified that both men had guns out as they approached the Ford Freestyle demanding that Swallow give them the car. fact @4735..4835 [cuts-against] | He testified he did not see Myore with a gun and thought he only “might have” or “probably” had one. fact @5064..5181 [supports] | Swallow also testified that he had previously seen Myore possessing a gun similar to one of the guns he saw that day. held @12434..12658 | In this case, a reasonable jury could find, based on Swallow’s testimony, that Myore and Running Shield brandished guns to force Swallow to surrender the vehicle and then fired shots before driving off in the stolen vehicle. gloss Sufficiency upheld. The only brandishing evidence was the victim's testimony, which the district court called "wishy washy"; the court treats the inconsistency as a credibility question for the jury. element during-relation : satisfied [proved] decider jury review affirmed party p1 count c1 route means-of-violent-crime pattern guns displayed to make the driver surrender the car, i.e. before the carjacking's taking was complete (contrast shots fired after driving away, Long Pumpkin) rule @12082..12233 | In Long Pumpkin we concluded that discharge of a firearm after the carjackers drove away in the stolen vehicle was not “during” the initial carjacking. fact @5182..5354 [supports] | Swallow testified that after he heard the gunshots, Myore and Running Shield walked toward the Ford Freestyle, Myore “jump[ed] in the black car and they take off speeding.” fact @3777..3830 [cuts-against] | “I was going to let them take the car,” he testified. fact @4532..4733 [cuts-against] | Initially, Swallow testified that he did not see a gun before he reached his front porch, where he heard multiple gunshots fired behind him and turned to see Running Shield putting a gun in his pocket. held @12659..12813 | This was sufficient evidence to convict Myore under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) of knowingly brandishing a firearm “during and in relation to” a crime of violence. gloss The contested point on appeal was temporal: Myore argued the victim relinquished the car before any gun was brandished, so the brandishing was not "during" the carjacking. The court holds a jury could place the taking at the moment the armed men demanded the car and the victim abandoned it. misfit Myore was convicted of AIDING AND ABETTING the carjacking and brandishing (Running Shield fired the shots); the opinion never analyses § 2 / Rosemond advance knowledge, so no `accomplice` block is recorded and the brandishing is treated as his own.