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cases/18usc922/f3d-935-838-us-v-mcadory.case

Source: cases/18usc922/f3d-935-838-us-v-mcadory.case

Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_935/0838_01/index.html

Verbatim annotated passages

Accordingly, we consider McAdory's prior convictions to have been "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," such that they would serve as predicates under § 922(g)(1), only if McAdory's convictions actually exposed him to sentences of that length.
None of McAdory's prior convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court convicted McAdory under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.

Exact source text

casedsl 1.2

# author: Flash3 (gemini-3.8-flash-high)
# triaged-by: Fable (2026-11-10)
case /f3d/935/0838-01
  name    United States v. McAdory
  cite    935 F.3d 838 (2019)
  court   United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
  date    2019-08-28
  url     catalog/cases/f3d/volume_935/0838_01/index.html
  source  ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl sha1=5124ded531b11e27ee6ddd6961d6633f1d8a8a32 chars=14530

opinion op : panel by Hawkins @0..13315, @13315..14530 controlling
party p1 : Ahmad McAdory
count c1 : 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

law 18usc922
  role    applied
  posture criminal appeal after guilty plea to § 922(g)(1); predicate-felony question first raised on appeal after intervening circuit authority (Valencia-Mendoza), reviewed de novo as a pure question of law; reversed with instructions to dismiss the indictment
  result  claimant-lost

element status.g1 : not-satisfied [law]
  party   p1
  count   c1
  route   qualifying-conviction
  pattern Washington convictions with statutory maxima above one year but mandatory standard ranges of 0-90 days and no exceptional-sentence findings
  rule @12584..12849 | Accordingly, we consider McAdory's prior convictions to have been "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," such that they would serve as predicates under § 922(g)(1), only if McAdory's convictions actually exposed him to sentences of that length.
  fact @3420..3562 [cuts-against] | For the Taking a Motor Vehicle without Permission conviction, McAdory pled guilty and had a standard range of actual confinement of 0-90 days.
  fact @3792..3915 [cuts-against] | For the Residential Burglary conviction, McAdory pled guilty and had a standard sentencing range of 0-30 days of detention.
  fact @4353..4477 [cuts-against absent] | The court imposed no confinement, and there is no indication the court made any special findings or sentencing enhancements.
  fact @7351..7487 [supports] | Thus, each of McAdory's prior offenses qualified as a felony because the statutory maximum for each offense exceeded one year in prison.
  fact @4478..4632 [supports] | McAdory pled guilty to violating § 922(g)(1) and admitted that each of these prior offenses was "punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year."
  held @12850..13190 | None of McAdory's prior convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court convicted McAdory under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.
  gloss   Ninth Circuit reverses a § 922(g)(1) conviction: under Washington's mandatory sentencing scheme none of the prior convictions actually exposed the defendant to more than one year, so none is a predicate. The statutory-maximum fact and the plea admission supported the element under the overruled Murillo rule only.