neochart v2 research

cases/18usc922/f-supp-2d-28-805-us-v-campbell.case

Source: cases/18usc922/f-supp-2d-28-805-us-v-campbell.case

Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f-supp-2d/volume_28/0805_01/index.html

Verbatim annotated passages

Under the categorical approach, the court looks only to the intrinsic nature of the offense itself as it is defined by statute, and does not consider any of the specific facts surrounding the alleged offense.
It is equally reasonable to infer that a person who has been convicted of a felony, yet is in unlawful possession of a firearm, is more likely to use that firearm in the course of committing a crime.
For all these reasons, then, I conclude that possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) constitutes a “crime of violence” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B).
In addition, I believe the evidence against Mr. Campbell on the pending federal charges are quite strong.

Exact source text

casedsl 1

case /f-supp-2d/28/0805-01
  name    United States v. Campbell
  cite    28 F. Supp. 2d 805 (1998)
  court   United States District Court for the Western District of New York
  date    1998-11-20
  url     catalog/cases/f-supp-2d/volume_28/0805_01/index.html
  source  ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_28.jsonl sha1=118dadafa00587a5d4564c964ce7d0055192562b chars=24938

law 18usc922 (g)(1)
  role    comparator
  posture criminal; pretrial detention order on an indictment charging felon-in-possession; the court decides, by the categorical approach, that a 922(g)(1) offense is a "crime of violence" under the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. 3156(a)(4)(B)) so that a detention hearing may be held, then orders detention on dangerousness and flight risk; guilt under 922(g)(1) is not adjudicated
  result  not-decided

element status.g1 : not-reached
  theory  categorical characterization of the felon-in-possession offense as a Bail Reform Act crime of violence
  variant categorical-nature/felon-in-possession-as-bail-act-crime-of-violence
  fact @18209..18326 [supports] | Campbell has an extensive prior record with nine convictions including three felony convictions over the past decade.
  rule @3917..4125 | Under the categorical approach, the court looks only to the intrinsic nature of the offense itself as it is defined by statute, and does not consider any of the specific facts surrounding the alleged offense.
  rule @11700..11899 | It is equally reasonable to infer that a person who has been convicted of a felony, yet is in unlawful possession of a firearm, is more likely to use that firearm in the course of committing a crime.
  held @16064..16269 | For all these reasons, then, I conclude that possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) constitutes a “crime of violence” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B).
  gloss The held line classifies the 922(g)(1) offense as a whole (felon status combined with possession) for another statute; it decides nothing about whether this defendant has a qualifying conviction. The prior-record sentence comes from the detention findings (3142(g)), on proffer, and is legally irrelevant to the categorical ruling; it is kept only as the alleged status fact.

element possession : not-reached
  scope   procedural
  variant actual/control
  fact @17746..17875 [supports] | It involves a charge that a convicted felon possessed and sold four semi-automatic guns in August of 1998, for the sum of $2,000.
  fact @20332..20531 [supports] | The proffer by the Government is that the gun sale was a hand-to-hand transaction and that there was surveillance by police officers and that some of the proceedings may indeed have been video taped.
  held @20226..20331 | In addition, I believe the evidence against Mr. Campbell on the pending federal charges are quite strong.
  gloss Weight-of-the-evidence factor of the detention decision (3142(g)), on government proffer only; not a finding of possession. The court also relies on the general proposition that simple possession is not literally violent but inherently risky in a felon's hands.

misfit Known (role cannot name the compared law): 922(g)(1) is the yardstick for 18 U.S.C. 3156(a)(4)(B) / 3142(f)(1)(A); the ruling is a property of the OFFENSE AS A WHOLE ("by its nature involves a substantial risk of force"), not of any element, so it is parked under status.g1 with a categorical-nature/ variant. No slot for a whole-offense characterization.
misfit Unlike Moncrieffe-type comparators the statute here is also the pending charge against this defendant, so the opinion carries real alleged 922(g) facts (street sale of four guns, three felony convictions) at a stage (detention, proffer, preponderance / clear-and-convincing) that no basis value describes; recorded in not-reached blocks. `result not-decided` hides that the Government won the detention motion.
misfit The court reasons that felons generally know they may not possess firearms ("it must be presumed he does so in conscious disregard of the law") as support for dangerousness; this touches knowledge-status only rhetorically (pre-Rehaif, and about knowledge of the prohibition, which the law file says is not the element), so no block was written.
misfit Good-law flag (known): district-court split in 1998 on whether felon-in-possession is a Bail Reform Act crime of violence; later circuit authority is not in the pinned text.