Source: cases/18usc1341/us-527-1-neder-v-us.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/us/volume_527/0001_01/index.html
Thus, under the rule that Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses, we cannot infer from the absence of an express reference to materiality that Congress intended to drop that element from the fraud statutes.
Accordingly, we hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.
we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for it to consider in the first instance whether the jury-instruction error was harmless.
The common-law requirements of “justifiable reli-anee” and “damages,” for example, plainly have no place in the federal fraud statutes.
By prohibiting the “scheme to defraud,” rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.
casedsl 1 case /us/527/0001-01 name Neder v. United States cite 527 U.S. 1 (1999) court Supreme Court of the United States date 1999-06-10 url catalog/cases/us/volume_527/0001_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/us_527.jsonl sha1=33412a8a9e886242007cfbf71e172757125b18dc chars=60000 law 18usc1341 role rule-announced posture criminal; jury conviction on 9 mail fraud counts (with wire fraud, bank fraud and tax counts) under instructions that omitted materiality, affirmed by CA11; certiorari on whether materiality is an element of the fraud statutes; the Court holds it is and remands for harmless-error review of the fraud counts result remanded element materiality : not-reached variant common-law-fraud-incorporation/materiality-omitted-from-jury-instruction fact @1174..1438 [supports] | In so doing, he concealed from lenders that he controlled the shell corporations, that he had purchased the land at prices substantially lower than the inflated resale prices, and that the limited partnerships had not made substantial down payments as represented. fact @2094..2245 [supports] | To obtain the loan, he falsely represented to the lender that he had satisfied a condition of the loan by making advance sales of 20 condominium units. fact @2926..3130 [supports] | Between September 1987 and March 1988, he submitted numerous requests based on false invoices, the lender approved the requests, and he obtained almost $8 million unrelated to any work actually performed. fact @4518..4651 [cuts-against absent] | In instructing the jury on mail fraud and wire fraud, the District Court did not include materiality as an element of either offense. rule @34460..34716 | Thus, under the rule that Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses, we cannot infer from the absence of an express reference to materiality that Congress intended to drop that element from the fraud statutes. rule @38141..38269 | Accordingly, we hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes. held @38417..38550 | we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for it to consider in the first instance whether the jury-instruction error was harmless. gloss The Court construes "scheme or artifice to defraud" to carry the common-law materiality requirement, but does not decide whether Neder's misstatements to the lenders were material or whether omitting the element was harmless on the fraud counts; that goes back to CA11. The fact lines are the Court's background recital of the lending schemes (and the instruction given), not findings on materiality; the absent-tagged line is a procedural fact, not conduct. gloss Materiality standard: footnote 5 quotes the Restatement (Second) of Torts 538 definition (reasonable person would attach importance, or maker knows the recipient does); the Part II Gaudin "natural tendency to influence" formulation is stated for the tax counts. element scheme : not-reached variant common-law-fraud-incorporation/reliance-and-damage-not-required rule @37212..37347 | The common-law requirements of “justifiable reli-anee” and “damages,” for example, plainly have no place in the federal fraud statutes. rule @37779..37953 | By prohibiting the “scheme to defraud,” rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted. gloss Stated as a step in the materiality reasoning (not everything in common-law fraud is incorporated): actual reliance and damage are not elements because the statute punishes the scheme, not the completed fraud. Not applied to Neder's facts. Also restates Durland: the statute reaches promises as to the future, beyond common-law false pretenses. misfit The holding is "X IS an element" (materiality) with application left to the court below; `role rule-announced` + not-reached carries that, but nothing marks the block as the origin of the element itself (the .law file cites this opinion as the element's rule), nor that the scheme block is a "not required" ruling (reliance, damage) rather than a test. Known item 2. misfit The fraud-count facts appear only in the Court's background narrative and are about bank-loan schemes charged under three statutes at once (9 mail, 9 wire, 12 bank fraud counts); the opinion never says which misstatements or which mailings belong to the 1341 counts, so the fact lines cannot be tied to this statute's counts. No mailing is described at all. misfit Most of the majority opinion (Part II) decides that omission of an element from the jury charge is subject to Chapman harmless-error review and applies it to the 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) tax counts (affirmed). That is the remand standard for the 1341 counts too, but it is a constitutional/procedural rule with no declared id; not recorded as a block. misfit The trial judge found materiality himself, outside the jury's presence, only for the bank fraud and tax counts; for mail and wire fraud no one found it. A lower-court block was not written because there is no lower-court materiality ruling on the 1341 counts to report. misfit Text capped at 60000 chars inside Justice Scalia's partial dissent; the majority opinion and its footnotes are complete. Separate opinions (Stevens, Scalia) agree with Part III and are not recorded.