Source: cases/15usc1/f3d-933-1136-in-re-nfl-sunday-ticket.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_933/1136_01/index.html
The Supreme Court has held that a horizontal agreement among competitors to pool separate property rights and enter into an agreement to license their rights vertically can constitute a Section 1 violation.
The defendants do not dispute that the complaint adequately alleges that defendants have contracts for the purpose of restraining trade, the first and second elements.
Alternatively, plaintiffs can show that a restraint injures competition if they plausibly allege "a naked restriction on price or output," such as "an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output."
We conclude that the complaint adequately alleges the element of injury to competition by alleging that the interlocking Teams-NFL and NFL-DirecTV Agreements injure competition.
To plead the fourth element, antitrust standing or antitrust injury, plaintiffs must allege that they were harmed by the injury to competition.
Accordingly, we conclude that Illinois Brick is not applicable here because the complaint adequately alleges that DirecTV conspired with the NFL and the NFL Teams to limit the production of telecasts to one per game, and that plaintiffs suffered antitrust injury due to this conspiracy to limit output.
In other words, when co-conspirators have jointly committed the antitrust violation, a plaintiff who is the immediate purchaser from any of the conspirators is directly injured by the violation.
Even though DirecTV is the immediate seller to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' allegation that they were directly injured by the conspiracy among the NFL teams, the NFL, and DirecTV is sufficient to allege antitrust standing for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss.
casedsl 1.2
# author: Flash1 (gemini-3.8-flash-high)
# triaged-by: Fable (2026-11-10)
case /f3d/933/1136-01
name Mucky Duck v. Directv, LLC (In re Nat'l Football League's Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig.)
cite 933 F.3d 1136 (2019)
# IR court field says: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
court United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
date 2019-08-13
url catalog/cases/f3d/volume_933/1136_01/index.html
source ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl sha1=75dd48261a2a2cb7b31ce8c8e20c1eeaef6bac10 chars=59999
opinion op : majority by Ikuta @0..52693 controlling
opinion dis : dissent by Smith @52693..59999
? opinion: the IR text is capped at 59999 chars; the majority is complete, the partial dissent (Part III(C) only: Illinois Brick bars the challenge to the Teams-NFL Agreement) is cut off near its end. No majority footnotes appear in the text.
party p1 : putative class of residential and commercial Sunday Ticket subscribers (plaintiffs) v. the NFL, its 32 teams and DirecTV
theory t1 : interlocking agreements: the Teams-NFL Agreement pooling the teams' telecast rights and the NFL-DirecTV Agreement giving DirecTV exclusive distribution of out-of-market games
law 15usc1
role applied
posture civil; Sunday Ticket subscribers sued the NFL, its teams and DirecTV under §§ 1 and 2, challenging the pooling of telecast rights and the exclusive satellite distribution agreement; district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6); CA9 reversed
result remanded
element agreement : satisfied [conceded]
party p1
theory t1
route _whole
pattern sports league: written agreement among separately owned teams to pool telecast rights in the league, plus the league's exclusive distribution contract
rule @31002..31208 | The Supreme Court has held that a horizontal agreement among competitors to pool separate property rights and enter into an agreement to license their rights vertically can constitute a Section 1 violation.
fact @13920..14284 [supports] | The 32 individual NFL teams, each of which is a separate "independently owned, and independently managed business," Am. Needle , 560 U.S. at 196, 130 S.Ct. 2201, entered into an agreement with the NFL ("Teams-NFL Agreement") to pool their telecasting rights and give the NFL the authority to exercise those rights, rather than exercising those rights individually.
fact @26975..27076 [supports] | According to the complaint, the NFL members vote to approve the contract between DirecTV and the NFL.
held @21862..22029 | The defendants do not dispute that the complaint adequately alleges that defendants have contracts for the purpose of restraining trade, the first and second elements.
? basis: [conceded] at the pleading stage: what is undisputed is that the complaint adequately alleges the contracts; [pleaded] is the alternative.
? guard: G3-cited-case the sentence describes this case's Teams-NFL Agreement; American Needle is cited only for the quoted description of the teams as independently owned businesses
element restraint.rule-of-reason : satisfied [pleaded]
party p1
theory t1
route anticompetitive-effect
pattern league-wide pooling of telecast rights limiting output to one telecast per game; naked output restriction as in NCAA v. Board of Regents, so no market definition needed
rule @23710..23915 | Alternatively, plaintiffs can show that a restraint injures competition if they plausibly allege "a naked restriction on price or output," such as "an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output."
fact @26142..26284 [supports] | Under the terms of the Teams-NFL and NFL-DirecTV Agreements, no individual NFL team is permitted to sell its telecasting rights independently.
fact @39090..39360 [supports] | The complaint alleges that defendants have limited output by restricting the quantity of telecasts available for sale, and that the NFL has set a uniform quantity of telecasts of football games-one per game-with no regard to the actual consumer demand for the telecasts.
fact @37687..37832 [supports] | And in another form of media, radio broadcasting, plaintiffs allege that the NFL Teams already negotiate individual radio broadcasting contracts.
fact @15530..15612 [cuts-against] | Thus, Sunday Ticket subscribers have access to both local and out-of-market games.
held @42090..42267 | We conclude that the complaint adequately alleges the element of injury to competition by alleging that the interlocking Teams-NFL and NFL-DirecTV Agreements injure competition.
gloss The court applies the rule of reason to both the horizontal and the vertical agreement (league sports, NCAA), views them together rather than separately, and rejects the arguments that cooperation is needed to produce telecasts at all, that output is not reduced because every game airs somewhere, and that no relevant market or market power is pleaded.
element injury : satisfied [pleaded]
party p1
theory t1
route antitrust-injury
pattern subscribers paying higher prices for a bundled out-of-market package because output of telecasts is restricted
rule @42374..42517 | To plead the fourth element, antitrust standing or antitrust injury, plaintiffs must allege that they were harmed by the injury to competition.
fact @16211..16363 [supports] | Fans who want to watch other out-of-market games cannot purchase games individually or by team, but are required to buy the entire package of NFL games.
fact @16492..16592 [supports] | In 2015, the cost of a basic Sunday Ticket package was $251.94 annually for residential subscribers.
fact @45961..46099 [supports] | This output limitation in turn results in prices for out-of-market games being higher than they would be in the absence of the conspiracy.
held @50111..50413 | Accordingly, we conclude that Illinois Brick is not applicable here because the complaint adequately alleges that DirecTV conspired with the NFL and the NFL Teams to limit the production of telecasts to one per game, and that plaintiffs suffered antitrust injury due to this conspiracy to limit output.
? route: the court treats "antitrust standing or antitrust injury" as one element and its analysis is the Illinois Brick question recorded in the `standing` block; antitrust injury gets no separate discussion (`_derivative` is the alternative).
element standing : satisfied [pleaded]
party p1
theory t1
route indirect-purchaser-rule
pattern direct purchasers from a distributor alleged to be a co-conspirator of the upstream rights holders in an output restriction
rule @45453..45647 | In other words, when co-conspirators have jointly committed the antitrust violation, a plaintiff who is the immediate purchaser from any of the conspirators is directly injured by the violation.
fact @16364..16491 [supports] | Additionally, in order to subscribe to the Sunday Ticket, consumers must also purchase a basic television package from DirecTV.
fact @45768..45960 [supports] | According to the complaint, the conspiracy involves both the Teams-NFL agreement and the NFL-DirecTV agreement, which work together as a single conspiracy to limit the output of NFL telecasts.
held @46394..46665 | Even though DirecTV is the immediate seller to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' allegation that they were directly injured by the conspiracy among the NFL teams, the NFL, and DirecTV is sufficient to allege antitrust standing for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss.
gloss Extends the Ninth Circuit's co-conspirator reading of Illinois Brick (Shamrock Foods, ATM Fee) from price-fixing to output-restriction conspiracies. Judge Smith dissents on exactly this point.
misfit The court assumes without deciding that the Sports Broadcasting Act exemption (15 U.S.C. § 1291) does not cover satellite distribution, because defendants did not invoke it; the law file has no element for that statutory exemption.