Source: cases/15usc1/f3d-924-57-iq-dental-supply-v-henry-schein.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f3d/volume_924/0057_01/index.html
A plaintiff raising an antitrust claim must demonstrate antitrust injury to " 'ensure[ ] that the harm claimed by the plaintiff corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first place.' " Gatt , 711 F.3d at 76 (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co ., 495 U.S. 328, 342, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990) ).
Assuming that IQ is operating in a market affected by anticompetitive conduct, the question of actual injury becomes whether IQ is worse off than it would be if the market were free of anticompetitive forces.
IQ has adequately pleaded an antitrust injury in accordance with our decision in Gatt.
A four-factor test is employed to determine whether an antitrust plaintiff is an efficient enforcer; thus we must evaluate: (1) "the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury," (2) "the existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement," (3) "the speculativeness of the alleged injury," and (4) "the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries."
We find, with respect to these particular allegations, that IQ is an efficient enforcer and thus has antitrust standing to proceed with its direct boycott claim against the Defendants.
The first efficient-enforcer factor requires a direct injury: "Directness in the antitrust context means close in the chain of causation."
In sum, we agree with the district court that because IQ is not positioned to efficiently enforce the claims that the Defendants harmed it by conspiring to boycott SourceOne-affiliated websites and the SDAs, IQ does not have antitrust standing to bring these claims.
This argument fails to recognize that the allegations of direct boycott are part of the Defendants' vast and multipronged attack on SourceOne's platforms, the SDAs, the distributors, and dental offices.
casedsl 1.2 # author: Flash1 (gemini-3.8-flash-high) # triaged-by: Fable (2026-11-10) case /f3d/924/0057-01 name IQ Dental Supply, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. cite 924 F.3d 57 (2019) court United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit date 2019-05-10 url catalog/cases/f3d/volume_924/0057_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl sha1=983cf1d79d65337d9fb84c708b6099d1bf01bf53 chars=36034 opinion op : majority by Walker @0..36034 controlling party p1 : IQ Dental Supply (small distributor selling through SourceOne's online portals, plaintiff) v. Henry Schein, Patterson and Benco (the three dominant dental-supply distributors) theory boycott : group boycott engineered by the three distributors against SourceOne, the state dental associations and IQ (all boycott allegations together) theory indirect : the "indirect boycott allegations": boycotts of SourceOne-affiliated websites and of the state dental associations, which harmed IQ derivatively theory direct : the "direct boycott allegations": pressure on manufacturers to stop supplying IQ and disparagement of IQ to its customers law 15usc1 role applied posture civil; dental-supply distributor sued the three dominant distributors under ยง 1 and state law, alleging they conspired to boycott an online sales portal, its partner dental associations and the plaintiff itself; district court dismissed for lack of antitrust standing; CA2 affirmed as to the indirect-boycott allegations and vacated and remanded as to the direct boycott of the plaintiff (the price-fixing claim was not pursued on appeal) result mixed element injury : satisfied [pleaded] party p1 theory boycott route antitrust-injury pattern replacement supplier that entered a market only because a boycott had driven out earlier suppliers, then lost sales to the same boycott rule @7488..7847 | A plaintiff raising an antitrust claim must demonstrate antitrust injury to " 'ensure[ ] that the harm claimed by the plaintiff corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first place.' " Gatt , 711 F.3d at 76 (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co ., 495 U.S. 328, 342, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990) ). rule @13789..13997 | Assuming that IQ is operating in a market affected by anticompetitive conduct, the question of actual injury becomes whether IQ is worse off than it would be if the market were free of anticompetitive forces. fact @3871..3958 [cuts-against] | SourceOne's need for a distributor to supply its online portals opened the door for IQ. fact @12470..12617 [supports] | Instead, IQ alleges that the Defendants' actions have decreased the number of sales it has been able to make through SourceOne-affiliated websites. fact @13998..14167 [supports] | IQ has alleged that the Defendants' anticompetitive conduct affected the market, and that, after it entered the market, its sales through SourceOne suffered as a result. held @8759..8845 | IQ has adequately pleaded an antitrust injury in accordance with our decision in Gatt. element standing : satisfied [pleaded] party p1 theory direct route efficient-enforcer pattern competitor that was itself the target of the boycott: suppliers pressured to cut it off rule @15297..15837 | A four-factor test is employed to determine whether an antitrust plaintiff is an efficient enforcer; thus we must evaluate: (1) "the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury," (2) "the existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement," (3) "the speculativeness of the alleged injury," and (4) "the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries." fact @25028..25214 [supports] | IQ claims that the Defendants directly pressured manufacturers to stop selling their products to IQ, and that the Defendants sought to damage IQ's business reputation with its customers. fact @26045..26162 [supports] | The value of each lost opportunity might be calculated based on IQ's historical sales data without undue speculation. fact @26302..26442 [supports] | Unlike the indirect claims, any damages in connection with the Defendants' direct boycott of IQ could not also be claimed by Arnold and DDS. held @24744..24928 | We find, with respect to these particular allegations, that IQ is an efficient enforcer and thus has antitrust standing to proceed with its direct boycott claim against the Defendants. element standing : not-satisfied [pleaded] party p1 theory indirect route efficient-enforcer pattern distributor harmed derivatively by a boycott aimed at the online portal it sold through; the portal itself has already sued rule @16698..16836 | The first efficient-enforcer factor requires a direct injury: "Directness in the antitrust context means close in the chain of causation." fact @17973..18118 [cuts-against] | By contrast, the Defendants here sought to put SourceOne-not IQ-out of business by undermining SourceOne's new and disruptive online sales model. fact @19445..19529 [cuts-against] | And SourceOne has in fact sued the Defendants seeking to enforce the antitrust laws. fact @19686..19847 [supports] | This is IQ's most promising claim that it is a properly motivated plaintiff: while SourceOne and the SDAs earn a commission on the sales, neither earns a profit. fact @22625..22883 [cuts-against] | The damages to which IQ lays claim-lost profits from sales it would have made through SourceOne-affiliated websites absent the Defendants' anticompetitive conduct-are exactly the same damages SourceOne's initial suppliers, DDS and Arnold, could have claimed. held @24137..24403 | In sum, we agree with the district court that because IQ is not positioned to efficiently enforce the claims that the Defendants harmed it by conspiring to boycott SourceOne-affiliated websites and the SDAs, IQ does not have antitrust standing to bring these claims. element agreement : satisfied [pleaded] party p1 theory direct route joinder-and-scope pattern pressure on the plaintiff's own suppliers pleaded as one prong of a wider concerted boycott of an online portal fact @3376..3595 [supports] | But sometime around April 2014 both DDS and Arnold stopped selling through SourceOne because the Defendants pressured dental-supply manufacturers to stop supplying DDS and Arnold due to their arrangement with SourceOne. fact @27439..27640 [supports] | IQ has alleged that the Defendants, as part of their elaborate and extensive scheme to force SourceOne and associated entities out of business, exerted pressure on some of IQ's suppliers to boycott IQ. held @26717..26919 | This argument fails to recognize that the allegations of direct boycott are part of the Defendants' vast and multipronged attack on SourceOne's platforms, the SDAs, the distributors, and dental offices. ? holding: the court says "Only antitrust standing is at issue here"; this block records only its rejection of the appellees' alternative argument that the complaint alleges no joint conduct to boycott IQ. It is a short pleading-stage answer, not a full analysis of concerted action, and a stricter reading would leave `agreement` not-reached. element restraint : not-reached party p1 gloss Only antitrust standing was before the court; at Gatt step one it says only that a group boycott is conduct of a kind the antitrust laws forbid.