Source: cases/15usc1/f2d-845-1367-us-v-cooperative-theatres.case
Case source: https://www.neochart.com/catalog/cases/f2d/volume_845/1367_01/index.html
the standard of review is whether the relevant evidence could be accepted by a reasonably minded jury as adequate and sufficient to support the conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
we find that the direct evidence presented through Handler’s testimony when viewed in favor of the government was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that defendants had entered into an illegal agreement not to seek business from each other’s accounts
There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”
This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality.
Therefore, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the agreement between the defendants not to call on each other’s customers was an unreasonable restraint of trade as a matter of law.
the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracy
In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.
Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the government is not required in a per se case to show that the conspirators entered into the agreement with knowledge of its probable anti-competitive effects.
casedsl 1 case /f2d/845/1367-01 name United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. cite 845 F.2d 1367 (1988) court United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit date 1988-03-08 url catalog/cases/f2d/volume_845/1367_01/index.html source ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl sha1=6699bbab46fc868b37cf3d374d86a2750e1f4d0a chars=24592 law 15usc1 role applied posture criminal; jury convictions of one corporation and its vice president; defendants appeal the per se instruction and sufficiency of the evidence result claimant-won element agreement : satisfied [proved] variant direct-evidence/immunized-coconspirator-testimony-of-meeting party Co-Op and Beaupain (appellants) fact @2808..2949 [supports] | In November, 1981, a luncheon meeting was held in Dayton, Ohio, and attended by Handler, Borack, Beaupain, and Beaupain’s boss, Blair Mooney. fact @4762..4849 [supports] | Handler replied that “Tri-State would not call on any Co-Operative Theatres’ accounts.” fact @5581..5847 [supports] | The government also called on three other theater owners who testified that Tri-State had called on them prior to November, 1981, but had subsequently refused their business on the grounds that Tri-State and Co-Op had an agreement not to take each other’s customers. fact @5848..6026 [supports] | One of the theater owners further testified that he also contacted the President of Co-Op, Blair Mooney, who confirmed the existence of the agreement between Co-Op and Tri-State. rule @22001..22190 | the standard of review is whether the relevant evidence could be accepted by a reasonably minded jury as adequate and sufficient to support the conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt held @23599..23865 | we find that the direct evidence presented through Handler’s testimony when viewed in favor of the government was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that defendants had entered into an illegal agreement not to seek business from each other’s accounts gloss Sufficiency upheld on a participant's testimony (equivocal on cross, rehabilitated on redirect) corroborated by customers who were turned away "because of the agreement"; the two company presidents who attended the same lunch were acquitted. element restraint.per-se : satisfied [law] variant horizontal-customer-allocation/no-solicitation-of-existing-accounts fact @984..1175 [supports] | This case involves an alleged agreement not to compete between two movie theater booking agents, Co-Operative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. (Co-Op), and Tri-State Theatre Services, Inc. (Tri-State). fact @250..400 [supports] | each of the two competing corporations agreed to refrain from competing for customers who were currently being serviced by the other rival corporation fact @402..501 [cuts-against] | Under the terms of the alleged agreement, the companies remained free to compete for new customers. fact @19623..19795 [supports absent] | As noted by the district court, the defendants failed to articulate a single pro-competitive justification for the horizontal restrictions imposed by the alleged agreement. rule @9969..10143 | There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.” rule @19471..19622 | This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality. held @21585..21786 | Therefore, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the agreement between the defendants not to call on each other’s customers was an unreasonable restraint of trade as a matter of law. gloss A limited allocation (existing accounts only, unsolicited switches arguably still allowed, new customers open) is still naked customer allocation; novelty of the "no-solicitation" label and absence of proven market effect do not take it out of the per se rule when no procompetitive justification is offered. element intent : not-reached role rule-announced variant knowing-joinder/per-se-no-proof-of-anticipated-effects rule @22567..22702 | the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracy rule @23032..23117 | In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed. held @22704..22906 | Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the government is not required in a per se case to show that the conspirators entered into the agreement with knowledge of its probable anti-competitive effects. gloss Rule about the CONTENT of the element, not a finding: in a per se case the government need not show knowledge of probable anticompetitive effects (a proposed extra requirement rejected). The jury had in fact been instructed on the stricter standard and convicted anyway; knowing joinder is reviewed only inside the global "sufficient evidence to support the convictions" conclusion (see the agreement block), with no separate held sentence. element commerce : not-reached misfit The intent holding is a RELATION between elements: because the restraint is per se, the intent element collapses to knowing joinder in the agreement. Recorded as intent not-reached / rule-announced (the law file states it as constraint per-se-presumes-intent), but a case block cannot point at a law-side constraint or say "conditional on restraint.per-se". misfit Mixed outcomes per defendant at trial (two corporations and one officer convicted, two presidents acquitted, one convicted corporation did not appeal): the acquittals are unreviewed jury verdicts, which `scope lower-court` + `party` could now carry, but the opinion offers no quotable sentence per acquitted defendant beyond a passing mention, so no block was added. misfit Basis is mixed inside a single element: restraint.per-se was decided as law on the indictment's description of the agreement (pretrial), while the existence of that agreement was proved to a jury; fact lines under restraint.per-se therefore quote the charged terms, not findings. misfit The negative fact that defendants offered no procompetitive justification is tagged [supports absent] (the spec's example is [cuts-against absent]; here the absence helps the element). It is really the failure of a rebuttal/justification step, for which there is still no slot.